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ABSTRACT
The robustness of neural networks to intended perturbations has recently attracted
significant attention. In this paper, we propose a new method, learning with a
strong adversary, that learns robust classifiers from supervised data by generating
adversarial examples as an intermediate step. A new and simple way of find-
ing adversarial examples is presented that is empirically stronger than existing
approaches in terms of the accuracy reduction as a function of perturbation mag-
nitude. Experimental results demonstrate that resulting learning method greatly
improves the robustness of the classification models produced.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep Neural Network (DNN) models have recently demonstrated impressive learning results in
many visual and speech classification problems (Krizhevsky et al., 2012; Hinton et al., 2012a).
One reason for this success is believed to be the expressive capacity of deep network architectures.
Even though classifiers are typically evaluated by their misclassification rate, robustness is also a
highly desirable property: intuitively, it is desirable for a classifier to be ‘smooth’ in the sense that
a small perturbation of its input should not change its predictions significantly. An intriguing recent
discovery is that DNN models do not typically possess such a robustness property (Szegedy et al.,
2013). An otherwise highly accurate DNN model can be fooled into misclassifying typical data
points by introducing a human-indistinguishable perturbation of the original inputs. We call such a
perturbed data set ‘adversarial examples’. An even more curious fact is that the same set of such
adversarial examples is also misclassified by a diverse set of classification models, such as KNN,
Boosting Tree, even if they are trained with different architectures and different hyperparameters.
Since the appearance of Szegedy et al. (2013), increasing attention has been paid to the curious
phenomenon of ‘adversarial perturbation’ in the deep learning community; see, for example (Good-
fellow et al., 2014; Fawzi et al., 2015; Miyato et al., 2015; Nøkland, 2015; Tabacof & Valle, 2015).
Goodfellow et al. (2014) suggest that one reason for the detrimental effect of adversarial examples
lies in the implicit linearity of the classification models in high dimensional spaces. Additional
exploration by Tabacof & Valle (2015) has demonstrated that, for image classification problems,
adversarial images inhabit large ”adversarial pockets” in the pixel space. Based on these observa-
tions, different ways of finding adversarial examples have been proposed, among which the most
relevant to our study is that of (Goodfellow et al., 2014), where a linear approximation is used to
obviate the need for any auxiliary optimization problem to be solved. In this paper, we further in-
vestigate the role of adversarial training on classifier robustness and propose a simple new approach
to finding ’stronger’ adversarial examples. Experimental results suggest that the proposed method is
more effective than previous approaches in the sense that the resulting DNN classifiers obtain worse
performance under the same magnitude of perturbation.
The main achievement of this paper is a training method that is able to produce robust classifiers
with high classification accuracy in the face of stronger data perturbation. The approach we propose
differs from previous approaches in a few ways. First, Goodfellow et al. (2014) suggests using
an augmented objective that combines the original training objective with an additional objective
that is measured after after the training inputs have been perturbed. Alternatively, (Nøkland, 2015)
suggest, as a specialization of the method in (Goodfellow et al., 2014), to only use the objective
defined on the perturbed data. However, there is no theoretical analysis to justify that classifiers
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learned in this way are indeed robust; both methods are proposed heuristically. In our proposed
approach, we formulate the learning procedure as a min-max problem that forces the learned DNN
model to be robust against adversarial examples, so that the learned classifier is inherently robust. In
particular, we allow an adversary to apply perturbations to each data point in an attempt to maximize
classification error, while the learning procedure attempts to minimize misclassification error against
the adversary. We call this learning procedure ‘learning with a strong adversary’. Such min-max
formulation has been discussed specifically in (Goodfellow et al., 2014), but emphasis is on its
regularization effect particularly for logistic regression. Our setting is more general and applicable
to different loss functions and different types of perturbations, and is the origin of our learning
procedure.1 It turns out that an efficient method for finding such adversarial examples is required
as an intermediate step to solve such a min-max problem, which is the first problem we address.
Then we develop the full min-max training procedure that incorporates robustness to adversarially
perturbed training data. The learning procedure that results turns out to have some similarities to
the one proposed in (Nøkland, 2015). Another min-max formulation is proposed in Miyato et al.
(2015) but still with the interpretation of regularization. These approaches are based on significantly
different understandings of this problem. Recently, a theoretical exploration of the robustness of
classifiers (Fawzi et al., 2015) suggests that, as expected, there is a trade-off between expressive
power and robustness. This paper can be considered as an exploration into this same trade-off from
an engineering perspective.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we propose a new method for finding
adversarial examples in Section 2. Section 3 is then devoted to developing the main method: a
new procedure for learning with a stronger form of adversary. Finally, we provide an experimental
evaluation of the proposed method on MNIST and CIFAR-10 in Section 4.
1.1 NOTATIONS
We denote the supervised training data by Z = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xN , yN )}. Let K be the number of
classes in the classification problem. The loss function used for training will be denoted by `. Given
a norm ‖ · ‖, let ‖ · ‖∗ denote its dual norm, such that ‖u‖∗ = max‖v‖≤1〈u, v〉. Denote the network
byN whose last layer is a softmax layer g(x) , α = (α1, . . . , αK) to be used for classification. So
N (x) is the predicted label for the sample x.
2 FINDING ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Consider an example (x, y) ∈ X × {1, 2, . . . ,K} and assume that N (x) = y, where y is the true
label for x. Our goal is to find a small perturbation r ∈ X so thatN (X + r) 6= y. This problem was
originally investigated by Szegedy et al. (2013), who propose the following perturbation procedure:
given x, solve
min
r
‖r‖ s.t. N (X + r) 6= N (X).
The simple method we propose to find such a perturbation r is based on the linear approximation of
g(x), gˆ(x+ r) = g(x) +Hr, where H = ∂g∂w |x is the Jacobian matrix.
As an alternative, we consider the following question: for a fixed index j 6= y, what is the minimal
r(j) satisfying N (x + r(j)) = j? Replacing g by its linear approximation gˆ, one of the necessary
conditions for such a perturbation r is:
Hjr(j) −Hyr(j) ≥ αy − αj ,
where Hj is the j-th row of H . Therefore, the norm of the optimal r∗(j) is greater than the following
objective value:
min
r(j)
‖r(j)‖ s.t. Hjr(j) −Hyr(j) ≥ αy − αj . (1)
The optimal solution to this problem is provided in Proposition 1.
1 Analysis of the regularization effect of such min-max formulation is postponed in the appendix, since it is
not closly related to the main content of the paper.
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Proposition 1. It is straightforward that the optimal objective value is ‖r(j)‖ = αy−αj‖Hj−Hy‖∗ . In
particular, the optimal r∗(j) for common norms are:
1. If ‖ · ‖ is the L2 norm, then r∗(j) = αy−αj‖Hj−Hy‖22 (Hj −Hy);
2. If ‖ · ‖ is the L∞ norm, then r∗(j) = αy−αj‖Hj−Hy‖1 sign(Hj −Hy);
3. If ‖ · ‖ is the L1 norm, then r∗(j) = c‖Hj−Hy‖∞ ek where k satisfies |(Hj − Hy)k| =
‖Hj −Hy‖∞. Here Vk is the k-th element of V .
However, such r∗(j) is necessary but not sufficient to guarantee that argmaxi gˆ(x + r(j))i = j. The
following proposition shows that in order to have gˆ make a wrong prediction, it is enough to use the
minimum among all r∗(j)’s.
Proposition 2. Let I = argmini ‖r∗(i)‖. Then r∗I is the solution of the following problem:
min
r
‖r‖ s.t. argmax
i
(gˆ(X + r))i 6= y.
Putting these observations together, we achieve an algorithm for finding adversarial examples, as
shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Finding Adversarial Examples
input (x, y); Network N ;
output r
1: Compute H by performing forward-backward propagation from the input layer to the softmax
layer g(x)
2: for j = 1, 2, . . . ,K do
3: Compute r∗(j) from Equation (1)
4: end for
5: Return r = r∗(I) where I = argmini ‖r∗(i)‖.
3 TOWARD ROBUST NEURAL NETWORKS
We enhance the robustness of a neural network model by preparing the network for the worst exam-
ples by training with the following objective:
min
g
∑
i
max
‖r(i)‖≤c
`(g(xi + r
(i)), yi); (2)
where g ranges over functions expressible by the network modelN (i.e. ranging over all parameters
in N ). In this formulation, the hyperparameter c that controls the magnitude of the perturbation
needs to be tuned. Note that when `(g(xi+r(i)), yi) = I(maxj(g(xi+r(i))j)6=yi), the objective function
is the misclassification error under perturbations. Often, ` is a surrogate for the misclassification loss
that is differentiable and smooth. Let Li(g) = max‖r(i)‖2≤c `(g(xi + r
(i)), yi). Thus the problem
is to find g∗ = argming
∑
i Li(g).
Related Works:
1. When taking ` to be the logistic loss, g to be a linear function, and the norm for perturbation to
be `∞, then the inner max problem has analytical solution, and Equation (2) matches the learning
objective in Section 5 of (Goodfellow et al., 2014).
2. Let ` be the negative log function and g be the probability predicted by the model. Viewing
yi as a distribution that has weight 1 on yi and 0 on other classes, then the classical entropy loss
is in fact DKL(yi‖p) where p = g(xi). Using these notions, Equation (2) can be rewritten as
minf
∑
maxr(i) DKL(yi ‖p˜) where p˜ = g(xi + r(i)). Similarly, the objective function proposed
in (Goodfellow et al., 2014) can be generalized as αDKL(yi‖p) + (1 − α)maxr(i) DKL(yi‖p˜).
Moreover, the one proposed in Miyato et al. (2015) can be interpreated asDKL(yi‖p)+DKL(p‖p˜).
3
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Experiments shows that our approach is able to achieve the best robustness while maintain high
classification accuracy.
To solve the problem (2) using SGD, one needs to compute the derivative of Li with respect to (the
parameters that define) g. The following preliminary proposition suggests a way of computing this
derivative.
Proposition 3. Given h : U × V → W differentiable almost everywhere, define L(v) =
maxu∈U h(u, v). Assume that L is uniformly Lipschitz-continuous as a function of v, then the fol-
lowing results holds almost everywhere:
∂L
∂v
(v0) =
∂h
∂v
(u∗, v0),
where u∗ = argmaxu h(u, v0).
Proof. Note that L is uniformly Lipschitz-continuous, therefore by Rademacher’s theorem, L is
differentiable almost everywhere. For v0 where L is differentiable, the Fre´chet subderivative of L is
actually a singleton set of its derivative.
Consider the function Lˆ(v) = h(u∗, v). Since h is differentiable, ∂h∂v (u
∗, v0) is the derivative of Lˆ
at point v0. Also Lˆ(v0) = L(v0). Thus, by Proposition 2 of (Neu & Szepesva´ri, 2012), ∂h∂v (u
∗, v0)
also belongs to the subderivative of L. Therefore,
∂L
∂v
(v0) =
∂h
∂v
(u∗, v0).
The differentiability of h in Proposition 3 usually holds. The uniformly Lipschitz-continuous of
neural networks was also discussed in the paper of Szegedy et al. (2013). It still remains to compute
u∗ in Proposition 3. In particular given (xi, yi), we need to solve
max
‖r(i)‖≤c
`(g(xi + r
(i)), yi). (3)
We postpone the solution for the above problem to the end of this section. Given that we can have
an approximate solution for Equation (3), a simple SGD method to compute a local solution for
Equation (2) is then shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Learning with an Adversary
input (xi, yi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N ; Initial g0;
output gˆ
1: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
2: for (xi, yi) in the current batch do
3: Use forward-backward propagation to compute ∂g∂x
4: Compute r∗ as the optimal perturbation to x, using the proposed methods in Section 3.1
5: Create a pseudo-sample to be (xˆi = xi + c r
∗
‖r∗‖2 , yi)
6: end for
7: Update the network gˆ using forward-backward propagation on the pseudo-sample (xˆi, yi) for
1 ≤ i ≤ N
8: end for
9: Return gˆ.
For complex prediction problems, deeper neural networks are usually proposed, which can be inter-
preted as consisting of two parts: the lower layers of the network can be interpreted as learning a
representation for the input data, while the upper layers can be interpreted as learning a classification
model on top of the learned representation. The number of layers that should be interpreted as pro-
viding representations versus classifications is not precise and varies between datasets; we treat this
as a hyperparameter in our method. Given such an interpretation, denote the representation layers
of the network as Nrep and the classification layers of the network as Ncla. We propose to perform
4
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the perturbation over the output ofNrep rather than the raw data. Thus the problem of learning with
an adversary can be formulated as follows:
min
Nrep,Ncla
∑
i
max
‖r(i)‖≤c
`
(
Ncla
(
Nrep(xi) + r(i)
)
, yi
)
. (4)
Similarly, Equation (4) can be solved by the following SGD method given in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Learning with an Adversary in the Split Network Interpretation
input (xi, yi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N ; Initial Ncla and Nrep;
output fˆ
1: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
2: for (xi, yi) in the current batch do
3: Use forward propagation to compute the output of Nrep, x˜i
4: Take x˜i as the input for Ncla
5: Use forward-backward propagation to compute ∂α∂x˜i
6: Compute r∗ as the optimal perturbation to x˜i, using the proposed methods in Section 3.1
7: Create a pseudo-sample to be (ˆ˜xi = x˜i + c r
∗
‖r∗‖ , yi)
8: end for
9: Use forward propagation to compute the output of Ncla on (ˆ˜xi, yi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N
10: Use backward propagation to update both Ncla
11: Use backward propagation to compute ∂Nrep∂W |x˜i,yi
12: Update Nrep by ∂`∂x˜i |(ˆ˜xi,yi)
∂Nrep
∂W |x˜i,yi
13: end for
14: Return Ncla and Nrep
3.1 COMPUTING THE PERTURBATION
We propose two different perturbation methods based on two different principles. The first proposed
method, similar to that of (Goodfellow et al., 2014), does not require the solution of an optimization
problem. Experimental results show that this method, compared to the method proposed in (Good-
fellow et al., 2014), is more effective in the sense that, under the same magnitude of perturbation,
the accuracy reduction in the network is greater.
3.1.1 LIKELIHOOD BASED LOSS
Assume the loss function `(x, y) = h(αy), where h is a non-negative decreasing function. A typical
example of such a loss would be the logistic regression loss. In fact, most of the network models use
a softmax layer as the last layer and a cross-entropy objective function. Recall that we would like to
find
r∗ = arg max
‖r(i)‖≤c
h
(
g(xi + r
(i))yi
)
, (5)
where xi could be the raw data or the output of Nrep. Since h is decreasing, r∗ =
argmin‖r(i)‖≤c g(xi + r(i))yi .
This problem can still be difficult to solve in general. Similarly, using its linear approximation
g˜(xi + r
(i))yi , i.e. g(xi + r
(i))yi ≈ g˜(xi + r(i))yi = g(xi)yi + 〈Hyi , r(i)〉, such that H = ∂g∂w |x is
the Jacobian matrix, it is then easy to see that using g˜(xi + r(i))yi in Equation (5), the solution for
r∗ can be recovered as r∗ = {r : ‖r‖ ≤ c; 〈Hyi , r(i)〉 = c‖Hyi‖∗}.
The optimal solutions for r∗ given common norms are:
1. If ‖ · ‖ is the L2 norm, then r∗(j) = c
Hyi
‖Hyi‖2 ;
2. If ‖ · ‖ is the L∞ norm, then r∗(j) = c sign(Hyi);
3. If ‖ · ‖ is the L1 norm, then r∗(j) = c ek, where k satisfies |Hyi | = ‖Hyi‖∞.
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Note that the second item here is exactly the method suggested in (Goodfellow et al., 2014). `2
norm is used in (Miyato et al., 2015) but with different objective function rather than negative log
likelihood, as mentioned at the begining of this section.
3.1.2 MISCLASSIFICATION BASED LOSS
In the case that the loss function ` is a surrogate loss for the misclassification rate, it is reasonable to
still use the misclassification rate as the loss function ` in Equation (3). In this case, the problem in
Equation (3) becomes finding a perturbation r : ‖r‖ ≤ c that forces the network N to misclassify
xi. In practice, for N to achieve a good approximation, c needs to be chosen to have a small value,
hence it might not be large enough to force a misclassification. One intuitive way to achieve this
is to perturb by r in the direction proposed in Section 2, since such direction is arguably the most
damaging direction for the perturbation. Therefore, in this case, we use
r∗ = c r∗I/‖r∗I‖,
where r∗I is the output of Algorithm 1.
4 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
To investigate the training method proposed above, in conjunction with the different approaches for
determining perturbations, we consider the MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998b) and CIFAR-10 data sets.
The MNIST data set contains 28x28 grey scale images of handwritten digits. We normalize the pixel
values into the range [0, 1] by dividing by 256. The CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009) dataset
is a tiny nature image dataset. CIFAR-10 datasets contains 10 different classes images, each image
is an RGB image in size of 32x32. Input images are subtracted by mean value 117, and randomly
cropped to size 28x28. We also normalize the pixel value into the range (-1, 1) by dividing 256. This
normalization is for evaluating perturbation magnitude by L2 norm. For both datasets, we randomly
choose 50,000 images for training and 10,000 for testing.
All experiment models are trained by using MXNet (Chen et al., 2015)2.
4.1 FINDING ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
We tested a variety of different perturbation methods on MNIST, including: 1. Perturbation based on
α using the `2 norm constraint, as shown in Section 2 (Adv Alpha); 2. Perturbation based on using a
loss function with the `2 norm constraint, as shown in Section 3.1 (Adv Loss); 3. Perturbation based
on using a loss function with the `∞ norm constraint, as shown in Section 3.1 (Adv Loss Sign). In
particular, a standard ‘LeNet’ model is trained on MNIST, with training and validation accuracy
being 100% and 99.1% respectively. Based on the learned network, different validation sets are then
generated by perturbing the original data with different perturbation methods. The magnitudes of
the perturbations range from 0.0 to 4.0 in `2 norm. An example of such successful perturbation
is show in Table 1. The classification accuracies on differently perturbed data sets are reported in
Figure 1.
The networks classification accuracy decreases with increasing magnitude of the perturbation. These
results suggest that Adv Alpha is consistently, but slightly, more effective than Adv Loss, and these
two method are significantly more effective than Adv Loss Sign.
Drawback of using α to find perturbations
Note that the difference in perturbation effectiveness between using α and using the loss function is
small. On the other hand, to compute the perturbation using α, one needs to compute ∂α∂x , which is
K times more expensive than the method using the loss function, which only needs to compute ∂`∂x .
(Recall that K is the number of classes.) Due to time limit, during the training procedure we only
use the adversarial examples generated from the loss function for our experiments.
2Reproduce code: https://github.com/Armstring/LearningwithaStrongAdversary
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Table 1: An visual example of using different perturbations; The magnitude of all the perturbations
are 1.5 in `2 norm. The true label of the image is 8. The first perturbed image is still predicted to be
8, while the other 2 perturbed images are predicted to be 3.
Adv Loss Sign Adv Loss Adv Alpha Original Image
Perturbed
Image
Noise
Figure 1: Validation accuracies of different perturbation methods. x axis denotes the `2 norm of the
perturbation.
4.2 LEARNING WITH AN ADVERSARY
We tested our overall learning approach on both MNIST and CIFAR-10. We measure the robustness
of each classifier on various adversarial sets. An adversarial set of the same type for each learned
classifier is generated based on the targeted classifier. We generated 3 types of adversarial data sets
for the above 5 classifiers corresponding to Adv Alpha, Adv Loss, and Adv Loss Sign. In addition,
we also evaluated the accuracy of these 5 classifiers on a fixed adversarial set, which is generated
based on the ‘Normal’ network using Adv Loss. Finally, we also report the original validation
accuracies of the different networks. We use `2 norm for our method to train the network.
Experiments on MNIST:
We first test different training methods on a 2-hidden-layer neural network model. In particular,
we considered: 1. Normal back-forward propagation training, 100 × 100 (Normal); 2. Normal
back-forward propagation training with Dropout, 200 × 200 (Dropout (Hinton et al., 2012b)); 3.
The method in (Goodfellow et al., 2014), 500 × 500 (Goodfellow’s method); 4. Learning with an
adversary on raw data, 500× 500 (LWA); 5. Learning with an adversary at the representation layer,
200 × 500 (LWA Rep). Here n ×m denote that the network has n nodes for the first hidden layer,
and m nodes for the second one. All of the results are tested under perturbations of with the `2 norm
constrained to at most 1.5.
We sumarize the results in Table 2. Note that the normal method can not afford any perturbation on
the validation set, showing that it is highly non-robust. By training with dropout, both the accuracy
and robustness of the neural network are improved, but robustness remains weak; for the adversar-
ial set generated by Adv Alpha in particular, the resulting classification accuracy is only 19.3%.
Goodfellow’s method improves the network’s robustness greatly, compared to the previous meth-
7
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Table 2: Classification accuracies for 2-hidden-layers neural network on MNIST: the best perfor-
mance on each adversarial sets are shown in bold. The magnitude of perturbations are 1.5 in `2
norm.
METHODS Validation Sets
Validation Fixed Adv Loss Sign Adv Loss Adv Alpha
Normal 0.977 0.361 0.287 0.201 0.074
Dropout 0.982 0.446 0.440 0.321 0.193
Goodfellow’s Method 0.991 0.972 0.939 0.844 0.836
LWA 0.990 0.974 0.944 0.867 0.862
LWA Rep 0.986 0.797 0.819 0.673 0.646
ods. However, the best accuracy and the most robustness are both achieved by LWA. In particular,
on the adversarial sets generated by our methods (Adv Loss and Adv Alpha), the performance is
improved from 84.4% to 86.7%, and from 83.6% to 86.2%. The result of LWA Rep is also reported
for comparison. Overall, it achieves worse performance than Goodfellow’s method (Goodfellow
et al., 2014) and LWA, but still much more robust than Dropout.
We also evaluated these learning methods on the LeNet model (LeCun et al., 1998a), which is
more complex, including convolution layers. We use Dropout for Goodfellow’s method and LWA.
The resulting learning curves are reported in Figure 2. It is interesting that we do not observe
the trade-off between robustness and accuracy once again; this phenomenon also occurred with
the 2-hidden-layers neural network. The final result is summarized in Table 3, which shows the
Figure 2: Validation accuracies on MNIST for different perturbation methods. x axis denotes the `2
norm of the perturbation.
great robustness of LWA. We don’t observe the superiority of perturbing the representation layer to
perturbing the raw data. In the learned networks, a small perturbation on the raw data incurs a much
larger perturbation on the representation layer, which makes LWA Rep difficult to achieve both high
accuracy and robustness. How to avoid such perturbation explosion in the representation network
remains open for future investigation.
Table 3: Classification accuracies for LeNet trained using LWA on MNIST. The magnitude of per-
turbations are 1.5 in `2 norm.
METHODS Validation Sets
Validation Fixed Adv Loss Sign Adv Loss Adv Alpha
Normal 0.9912 0.7456 0.8082 0.5194 0.5014
Dropout 0.9922 0.7217 0.7694 0.5322 0.4893
Goodfellow’s method 0.9937 0.9744 0.9755 0.9066 0.9035
LWA 0.9934 0.9822 0.9859 0.9632 0.9627
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Experiments on CIFAR-10:
CIFAR-10 is a more difficult task compared to MNIST. Inspired by VGG-D Network (Simonyan &
Zisserman, 2014), we use a network formed by 6 convolution layers with 3 fully connected layers.
Same to VGG-Network, we use ReLU as the activation function. For each convolution stage, we
use three 3x3 convolution layers followed by a max-pooling layer with stride of 2. We use 128, 256
filters for each convolution stage correspondingly. For three fully connected layer, we use 2048,
2048, 10 hidden units. We also split this network in representation learner and classifier view: the
last two fully connected layers with hidden units 2048 and 10 are classifier and other layers below
formed a representation learner. We compare the following methods: 1. Normal training (Normal);
2. Normal training with Dropout (Dropout); 3. Goodfellow’s method with Dropout (Goodfellow’s
method); 3. Learning with a strong adversary on raw data with Dropout (LWA); 4. Learning with a
strong adversary at the representation layer with Dropout (LWA Rep). We use batch normalization
(BN) (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015) to stabilize the learning of LWA Rep. We also test the performances of
different methods with batch normalization (BN). The results are summarized in Table 4. Learning
with a strong adversary again achieves better robustness, but we also observe a small decrease on
their classification accuracies.
Table 4: Classification accuracies on CIFAR-10: the best performance on each adversarial sets are
shown in bold. The magnitude of perturbations are 0.5 in `2 norm.
METHODS Validation Sets
Validation Fixed Adv Loss Sign Adv Loss Adv Alpha
Normal 0.850 0.769 0.510 0.420 0.410
Dropout 0.881 0.774 0.571 0.480 0.466
Goodfellow’s method 0.856 0.818 0.794 0.745 0.734
LWA 0.864 0.831 0.803 0.760 0.750
Normal + BN 0.887 0.793 0.765 0.747 0.738
Dropout + BN 0.895 0.810 0.729 0.697 0.687
Goodfellow’s method + BN 0.886 0.856 0.821 0.775 0.754
LWA + BN 0.890 0.863 0.823 0.785 0.759
LWA Rep + BN 0.832 0.746 0.636 0.604 0.574
5 CONCLUSION
We investigate the curious phenomenon of ’adversarial perturbation’ in a formal min-max problem
setting. A generic algorithm is developed based on the proposed min-max formulation, which is
more general and allows to replace previous heuristic algorithms with formally derived ones. We
also propose a more efficient way in finding adversarial examples for a given network. The experi-
mental results suggests that learning with a strong adversary is promising in the sense that compared
to the benchmarks in the literature, it achieves significantly better robustness while maintain high
normal accuracy.
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A ANALYSIS OF THE REGULARIZATION EFFECT OF LEARNING WITH AN
ADVERSARY ON LOGISTIC REGRESSION
Perhaps the most simple neural network is the binary logistic regression. We investigate the behavior
of learning with an adversary on the logistic regression model in this section. Let `(z) = − log(1 +
exp(−z)). Thus logistic regression is to solve the following problem:
min
w
∑
i
max
‖r(i)‖≤c
`(yiw
>(xi + r(i))). (6)
Proposition 4. The problem 6 is still a convex problem.
Proof. In fact, there is a closed form solution for the maximization subproblem in (6). Not that ` is
strictly decreasing, thus, Equation (6) is equivalent to
min
w
∑
i
`(yiw
>xi − c‖w‖∗).
Let h(w) denote the concave function of w, yiw>xi− c‖w‖∗. To prove `(h(w)) is convex, consider
` (h(w1)) + `(h(w2)) ≥ 2`
(
h(w1) + h(w2)
2
)
≥ 2`
(
h
(
w1 + w2
2
))
,
where the first inequality is because of the convexity of `, and the second inequality is because of
the monotonicity of ` and the concavity of h.
Let Rz(w) = max‖r(i)‖≤c `(yiw>(xi + r(i))) − `(yiw>xi) ≥ 0. The behavior of Rz is a data-
dependent regularization. The next proposition shows that different to common `p regularization, it
is NOT a convex function.
Proposition 5. The induced regularization Rz(w) is non-convex.
Proof. An counter example is enough to prove that Rz(w) is non-convex. Let c = 0.5 and z =
(x, y) = (1, 1), then Rz(w) : R→ R is
Rz(w) = log (1 + exp(−0.5w))− log (1 + exp(−w)) .
The figure of this function clearly shows its non-convexity.
One of the common problem about logistic regression without regularization is that there is no valid
solution given a linearly separable data set Z. The following proposition shows that this issue is
relieved by learning with an adversary.
Proposition 6. Assume that the linearly separable data setZ has a margin less than 2c, then logistic
regression with adversary is guaranteed to have bounded solutions. Moreover, if ‖ · ‖∗ is twice
differentiable almost everywhere and
∑
i
∂Qi
∂w
∂Qi
∂w
>
is positive definite whereQi = −yix>i w+‖w‖∗,
then logistic regression with adversary has unique solution.
Proof. Since the margin of Z is less than 2c, after the data is perturbed, it is no longer linear
separable. Therefore for any w, there exists some i such that −yiw>xi + c‖w‖∗. Note that
−yiw>xi + c‖w‖∗ is homogeneous in w. Thus, if the optimal solution w∗ has a infinity norm,
then ∑
i
log
(
1 + exp(−yiw∗>xi + c‖w∗‖∗)
)
=∞.
However, assigning w = 0 have finite loss. Therefore, w∗ is bounded.
Moreover, since ‖ · ‖∗ is twice differentiable, consider the Hession matrix
H =
∑
i
eQi
(1 + eQi)2
∂Qi
∂w
∂Qi
∂w
>
+
eQi
(1 + eQi)2
∂2Qi
∂2w
.
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Note that ‖w‖∗ is convex, so is Qi. Thus ∂
2Qi
∂2w is positive semi-definite. Since
∑
i
∂Qi
∂w
∂Qi
∂w
>
is
positive definite, and e
Qi
(1+eQi )2
> 0 for any i,H is positive definite. Therefore, the objective function
is strictly convex with respect to w. Combining the boundedness of w and being strictly convex of `
leads to the unique of w∗.
Remark 1. Unlike adding a regularization term to the objective function, learning with an adver-
sary can only guarantee unique solutions, when the data set is linearly separable with small margin.
In such sense, learning with an adversary is a weaker regularization.
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